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Logical formalisation of agent behaviour is desirable, not only in order to provide a clear semantics of agent-based sys-
tems, but also to provide the foundation for sophisticated reasoning techniques to be used on, and by, the agents them-
selves. The possible worlds semantics oﬀered by modal logic has proved to be a successful framework in which to model
mental attitudes of agents such as beliefs, desires and intentions. The most popular choices for modeling the informational
attitudes involves annotating the agent with an S5-like logic for knowledge, or a KD45-like logic for belief. However, using
these logics in their standard form, an agent cannot distinguish situations in which the evidence for a certain fact is ‘equally
distributed’ over its alternatives, from situations in which there is only one, almost negligible, counterexample to a ‘fact’.
Probabilistic modal logics are a way to address this, but they easily end up being both computationally and conceptually
complex, for example often lacking the property of compactness. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic modal logic
PFKD45, in which the probabilities of the possible worlds range over a ﬁnite domain of values, while still allowing the
agent to reason about inﬁnitely many options. In this way, the logic remains compact, implying that the agent still has
to consider only ﬁnitely many possibilities for probability distributions during a reasoning task. We demonstrate a sound,
compact and complete axiomatization for PFKD45 and show that it has several appealing features. Then, we discuss an
implemented decision procedure for the logic, and provide a small example.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Agent technology is increasingly used in contemporary systems. The overall idea is that an agent aims at
maximizing its performance, based on environmental evidence and its knowledge, or beliefs. In this context,
the representation of beliefs plays an important role in the agent description. This is the reason why, when
considering the agent’s representation, the chosen formalism often characterises the agent’s state of ‘‘mind’’.0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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ful agent design.
One possible approach to an agent’s representation of knowledge (or belief) is the use of a formal language,
whose syntax and semantics are precisely deﬁned. In this way, a logical agent description and its associated
semantics are consequently strongly linked. As information about the world may be vague, imperfect, uncer-
tain, or ambiguous, agents should be able to represent and reason under uncertainty in order to operate in
such an environment. By considering interaction with the ‘‘real’’ world, we require agent descriptions to incor-
porate some elements of uncertainty. Note that, in this paper, we will not consider multi-agent settings, in
which agents have uncertain predictions about other agents’ uncertainty.
Here we use a possible worlds semantics (also known as Kripke structures, or models [17]) as the seman-
tical basis that characterises modal logics of knowledge and belief, and as a means of expressing uncertainty
with respect to the true state of the world. Given a situation of a system, one could draw a map of states
considered possible and, consequently, be able to determine what is believed in that situation. In this context,
a set of possible worlds would represent the doxastic possibilities. In other words, by having worlds that are
named ‘‘possible’’, an agent expresses its ‘‘doubts’’ about which is the ‘‘real’’ situation, i.e., its uncertainty
about the true state of the world. The more worlds an agent considers possible, the more uncertain it is,
and the less it believes. This is what makes possible worlds a qualitative measure of an agent’s uncertainty
[12].
The most popular choices for modelling informational attitudes such as beliefs, involve annotating the
agent with a KD45-like logic [8,19]. However, when using logics such as KD45 in its standard form, an agent
cannot distinguish situations in which the evidence for a certain fact is ‘equally distributed’ over its alterna-
tives, from situations in which there is only one, almost negligible, counterexample to the ‘fact’. Probabilistic
logics (cf. [21]) and probabilistic modal logics [12] are a way to address this. In particular, probabilistic logics
of knowledge and belief [13,6,24] aim at removing the limitations implied by classical epistemic and doxastic
logic. In epistemic logic the formalization is restricted to sentences such as ‘‘agent knows u’’ or ‘‘agent does
not know u’’, in which no quantiﬁcation of the agent’s certainty is possible.
We present a logic that builds upon the natural framework of Kripke models, while allowing us to reason
about uncertainty. For us it is both important and interesting to capture, and express, the notion of degrees of
uncertainty within the agent itself. This means, intuitively, that we want to express statements like: ‘‘agent i
believes that the probability of statement b being true is greater than x’’. In this sense, the agent can have more
(or less) conﬁdence in certain facts. More speciﬁcally, we introduce the PFKD45 Logic which extends, in some
aspects, the system PFD given in [24] (which in turn was inspired by the logic from [9]). We propose not only a
complete axiomatization for the logic, but also a decision procedure that permits us to verify the satisﬁability
of PFKD45-formulae. We claim that PFKD45 represents a good candidate for representing and reasoning
about uncertainty within computational agents, especially because, contrary to many logical approaches to
probabilistic reasoning, it is conceptually simple and logically compact—we come back to this in the conclud-
ing section.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a description of the language, including basic
deﬁnitions and a complete axiomatization. In the subsequent section we provide the semantics and establish
some meta-logical properties such as soundness, completeness and the ﬁnite model property. An implemented
decision procedure for the logic is presented in Section 4. Finally, we consider related work and provide con-
cluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Logic: language and axioms
In this paper we introduce the logic PFKD45, an extension of the PFD system, introduced by van der Hoek
in [24], which in turn was inspired by the work of Fattorosi and Amati [9]. The PFKD45 basic modal operator
P> allows us to write formulae such as P>0:5u, meaning that the ‘‘agent believes that the probability of u being
true is strictly greater than 0.5’’. The other operators (with self-explanatory meaning) PP, P<, P6 and P= can
each be deﬁned in terms of the basic one. Since probabilities range from 0 to 1, and the probability of a for-
mula is given by the sum of values associated to the worlds in which this formula holds, PP1 is identiﬁed with
the classical modal operator B for belief.
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some ﬁnite base set F. The motivation for this, as will be explained in Section 5, is the restoration of compact-
ness for the logic. In Section 2.1 it will also become clear that, although this restricts probability assignments
to a ﬁnite range, it is still possible to express and reason about arbitrary probabilities.
2.1. Language description
The language L of PFKD45 (as for PFD originally described in [24]) consists of a countable set of
propositional symbols P, the logical connectives  and _ (with standard deﬁnitions for ?, >, ^, !, M),
and parentheses. We also deﬁne a modal operator P>x , where x is a rational number within the closed interval
[0,1].
The logic is deﬁned relative to a ﬁnite ﬁxed base set F with {0,1}  F = {x0,x1, . . . ,xn}  [0, 1]. It is
assumed that xi < xi+1, if i < n (implying 0 = x0 and xn = 1). This is no restriction on the language of the
logic: here, the basic operator is P>x , where x 2 [0,1], with the intended meaning of P>x u being: ‘‘it is
believed that the probability of u being true is (strictly) greater than x’’. From the deﬁnition of the basic
modal operator P> we derive the deﬁnitions of the other modal operators (x representing an arbitrary value
over [0,1]):
D1. PPx u  :P>1x:u
D2. P<x u  P>1x:u
D3. P6x u  :P<1xu
D4. P¼x u  :P>x u ^ :P<x u
In Section 2.2 we establish that these operators have the expected properties. For instance, we show that
P6x u is equivalent to ðP<x u _ P¼x uÞ.
The probability values used for assignments are taken from a ﬁnite set of rational numbers, which we call F.
This set includes the extreme values 0 and 1 in order to reason about absolute certainty, and is moreover
closed under restricted (if the sum does not exceed 1) addition—to represent reasoning about mutually exclu-
sive disjunctions—and complement with respect to 1—to deal with negation. The formal deﬁnition of this set
is as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A set F is a base for the logic PFKD45 if it satisﬁes:
(1) F is ﬁnite
(2) {0,1}  F  [0,1]
(3) x, y 2 F and (x + y 6 1)) (x + y) 2 F
(4) x 2 F) (1  x) 2 F
Let d be such that 0 < d 6 1. We say that D is generated by d, notation D ¼~d, if D ¼ fx 2 ½0; 1j9k 2
N x ¼ k  dg. Not only is every generated set a base set, but the converse also holds:
Observation 2. F is a base set iﬀ F ¼~d for some d 2 (0,1].2.2. Axioms and some theorems
We do not restrict the reasoning about probabilities to numbers from F, only semantically the values for
probabilities come from this set. In other words, even though F is a ﬁnite set of speciﬁc values, one can still
represent facts about numbers not in F. So, let x and y be arbitrary values over [0,1] and let xi, xi+1 be elements
of F (0 6 i < n), the inference rules (R1 and R2) and axioms (A1–A9) of PFKD45 are deﬁned in the following
way.
R1. From u and u) w infer w (modus ponens)
R2. From u infer PP1 u (necessitation rule)
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A2. PP1 ðu! wÞ ! ½ðP>x u! P>x wÞ ^ ðP>x u! PPx wÞ ^ ðPPx u! PPx wÞ
A3. PP1 ðu! wÞ ! ðPPx u! P>y wÞ (where y < x)
A4. PP0 u
A5. P>xþyðu _ wÞ ! ðP>x u _ P>y wÞ (where x + y 2 [0,1])
A6. PP1 :ðu ^ wÞ ! ððP>x u ^ PPy wÞ ! P>xþyðu _ wÞÞ (where x + y 2 [0,1])
A7. P>xiu! PPxiþ1u
A8. ðP>0 PPx u! PPx uÞ ^ ðP>0 P6x u! P6x uÞ
A9. ðPPx u! PP1 PPx uÞ ^ ðP6x u! PP1 P6x uÞ
We say that PFKD45 ‘ u, if there is a proof for u, using the axioms and inference rules of PFKD45, and in
such a case we say that u is derivable. According to the ﬁrst axiom, all the propositional tautologies are part of
the system. The axioms A2–A6 all reﬂect basic properties of probabilities. Axioms A2 and A3 assume a certain
implication: it has probability 1. Given that, A2 expresses that any probability for the consequent is at least the
probability of the antecedent, and that ‘greater than’ implies ‘at least’. Axiom A3 says that the probability of
the consequent is greater than any number that is smaller than the lower bound for the antecedent. Axiom A4
guarantees that no probability is negative, and A5 guarantees that the probability of a disjunction is obtained
from the probability of its disjuncts. By Axiom A6 we have that the probability of a disjunction of mutual
exclusive assertions is at least the sum of the individual probabilities of those assertions.
Axiom A7 reﬂects the peculiarity of having a base set F: it says that, if a probability is bigger than a certain
value in F, it must be at least the next value. In other words, it enforces that arbitrary values collapse to the
values present in F. Axioms A8 and A9 are new w.r.t. [24] and emphasize the relation with the modal logic
KD45, making our agents doxastically introspective. (This will be made precise later in Theorem 5.) Axiom
A8 denotes that, if the agent assigns a positive probability to some probabilistic judgment, then it incorporates
this judgment. Axiom A9 states that the agent is absolutely sure about its own probabilistic beliefs.
To highlight the use of PFKD45, we present a simple planning example proposed in Kushmerick et al. [18]
and show how PFKD45 can be used to specify and reason about its properties.
Example 3 (Robot With a Bomb). The example is described as follows. A robot is given two packages, and
told that exactly one of them contains a bomb. It needs to defuse the bomb, and the only way to do so is to
‘dunk’ the package containing the bomb in the toilet. Placing a package in the toilet might (as we consider here
with probability 0.1) ‘clog’ the toilet, and that is to be avoided.
Suppose both goals are desired, i.e., we want to defuse bomb and have an unclogged toilet. Furthermore,
assume that we want this to happen with probability at least 0.8.
Using the predicates1 in(Package,Bomb), dunk(Package), and clogged(Toilet), a possible speciﬁcation would
be:
A. in(package1,bomb)M in(package2,bomb)
B. P¼0:5inðpackage1; bombÞ ^ P¼0:5inðpackage2; bombÞ
C. One valuation chosen among the following:1 Alt(1) dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2)
(2) dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2)
(3) dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2)
(4) dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2)D1. dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2) ! ðP¼1 :defusedðbombÞ ^ P¼1 :cloggedðtoiletÞÞ
D2. dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2) ! ðP¼0:5:defusedðbombÞ ^ P¼0:9:cloggedðtoiletÞÞ
D3. dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2) ! ðP¼0:5:defusedðbombÞ ^ P¼0:9:cloggedðtoiletÞÞ
D4. dunk(package1) ^ dunk(package2) ! ðP¼1 defusedðbombÞ ^ P¼0:8:cloggedðtoiletÞÞ
E. PP0:8ðdefusedðbombÞ ^ :cloggedðtoiletÞÞhough we use predicate symbols for brevity, the example is purely propositional.
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are to be found in Appendix A, unless stated otherwise.
Lemma 4. The following theorems are derivable from PFKD45. A proof is to be found in [24]:
L1. P61 u
L2. PP1 u$ P¼1 uTheorem 5. Define the belief operator ‘B’ using Bu ¼ PP1 u. Based on this, we can infer the following.
(a) All KD45-properties of B are derivable in PFKD45:
(1) ‘ u) ‘ Bu
(2) ‘ B(u! w)! (Bu! Bw)
(3) ‘ Bu! BBu
(4) ‘ Bu! BBu(b) We say that a formula in L is modal if it is built from atomic propositions, using only the logical
connectives and the modal operator B. We claim that, for all modal formulae, u, PFKD45 ‘ u iﬀ
KD45 ‘ u.
Below we present some further theorems of PFKD45 (Proofs are to be found in [24]) since PFKD45 extends
PFD, the proof is similar to that in [24]. In our schemes, x, y represent arbitrary values over [0,1]. We also
deﬁnerðu1;u2; . . . ;ukÞ 
_
i
ui
 !
^
^
16i<j6k
:ðui ^ ujÞ
 !Theorem 6. For all u, w in the language and all x 2 [0,1]:
T1. PPx u$ ðP>x u _ P¼x uÞ ^ P6x $ ðP<x u _ P¼x uÞ
T2. rðP>x u; P¼x u; P<x uÞ
T3. :ðP¼x u ^ P¼y uÞ (y5 x)
T4. ð:P<x u$ PPx uÞ ^ ð:P>x u$ P6x uÞ
T5. P¼x u$ ðPPx u ^ P6x uÞ
T6. P>x u! P>y u (y 6 x)
T7. P¼x u$ P¼1x:u
T8. ðPP1 :ðu ^ wÞ ^ P¼x uÞ $ ðP¼y w! P¼xþyðu _ wÞÞ
Recall that our logic is based on a ﬁnite set of probability values F. Although the use of a base set may seem
restrictive, we have seen that Axiom A7 ensures the possibility of arbitrary values being used. In addition, the
following lemma shows a beneﬁt of having a ﬁnite base F: we can express, in the language, that every formula
has a probability. The proof is again similar to one given in [24].
Lemma 7. For all u 2 L, the following is a PFKD45-theorem:rðP¼x0u; P¼x1u; . . . ; P¼xnuÞ; where F ¼ f0 ¼ x0; x1; . . . ; xn ¼ 1g3. Semantics and properties
Formulae are interpreted on Probabilistic Kripke Models over F (or PFKD45 models). PPx u is true at a
world w if the probability values assigned to the possible worlds that verify u sum up to at least x.
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The classical Kripke model semantics refers to a collection of possible worlds. Diﬀerent worlds may have
diﬀerent interpretations for sentences. A probabilistic Kripke model adds the concept of a probability distri-
bution to the picture of possible worlds. That is, there is an assignment of probability values to the set of pos-
sible worlds in accordance with the formulae speciﬁed. Naturally, once those worlds model sentences of the
language, we have an assignment of probabilities to the sentences themselves. In our case, assignments are pro-
vided over F, meaning that probability values assigned are in the assumed base set.
Deﬁnition 8. For each base set, F, PFKD45 is the class of all models M = hW,PF,pi for which:
• W is a non-empty set (of worlds)
• PF is a function PF : W! F, satisfying
P
w2W PF ðwÞ ¼ 1
• p is a valuation: W · P! {true, false}
The truth deﬁnition for formulae is inductively deﬁned as:
• (M,w) j = p iﬀ p(w,p) = true, for atomic sentences p
• (M,w) j = u iﬀ not (M,w) j = u
• (M,w) j = u ^ w iﬀ (M,w) j = u and (M,w) j = w
• ðM ;wÞ j ¼ P>x u iff
P
fw0 jðM ;w0ÞugPF ðw0Þ
 
> x
Also,M j = u is short for "w 2W, (M,w) j = u, and PFKD45 j = u abbreviates that for eachPFKD45 model
M, we have M j = u. In that case, we say that u is valid.
In contrast to the deﬁnition of PF found in [24] which allowed diﬀerent sets of worlds to have diﬀerent prob-
ability distributions, the probability distribution we deﬁne here is independent of the world. This topic is dis-
cussed in detail later, in Section 3.3. Fig. 1 shows an example of a probabilistic model.
One can relate this semantics to a more standard Kripke semantics as follows. Given M = hW,PF,pi, ﬁrst
choose an arbitrary world w in the set W of the model M. Then, let W 0 be {w} [ {w 0jPF(w 0) > 0}. Finally,
deﬁne R 0(x,y) if, and only if, PF(y) > 0, i.e., a world is accessible (from any world) if, and only if, its proba-
bility is positive. LetM 0w ¼ hW 0;R0; p0i be the model thus obtained, with p 0 being the restriction of p toW 0. The
following (we omit the proof, but it follows directly from Theorem 5) gives a semantic motivation for coining
our system PFKD45:
Proposition 9. Given a PFKD45 model M = hW,PF,pi and a world w, let M 0w ¼ hW 0;R0; p0i be obtained as
described above. Moreover, let a purely modal formula from PFKD45 be a formula in which all modal operators
are PP1 or, equivalently, B. Then:
(1) for every purely modal formula u, we have (M,w) j = u iff M 0w;w j ¼ u
(2) the accessibility relation R 0 is serial, transitive and EuclideanNote that these are precisely the properties of models for KD45 modal logics [19].Fig. 1. An example of a probabilistic belief model: p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
N. de Carvalho Ferreira et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 35–51 413.2. Logical properties
In Section 2.2 the axiomatic system of PFKD45 was presented. This system is sound with respect to the
semantics of Deﬁnition 8 if, for all u, we have PFKD45 ‘ u) PFKD45  u. In other words, what is deriv-
able is valid. Conversely, PFKD45 is complete if the implication holds in the other direction. In other words,
what is valid is derivable.
Lemma 10 (PFKD45 Soundness). For all u : PF KD45 ‘ u) PFKD45  u.
The completeness property refers to the opposite direction. Having a complete system ensures that valid
sentences are derivable from the theory. The completeness of PFKD45 is what we show next. Let u be a con-
sistent formula of PFKD45, i.e., PFKD45 0 u. LetW be the set of sub-formulae of u closed under single nega-
tion and satisfying, for any  within f<;>;6;P;¼g; ðPx w 2 WÞ ) fP¼xiwjxi 2 F g  W. We will now show
how to construct a model that satisﬁes u. Given a set of formulas D, a set R is D-maximal consistent if (i)
R  D, (ii) R is consistent, and, ﬁnally (iii) for no d 2 DnR is R [ {d} consistent. In words: R is a maximal con-
sistent part of D. With W being ﬁnite, say jWj = k, we can deﬁne the W-maximal consistent sets as C1,
C2, . . . ,Cn, n 6 2k. Let ci be the conjunction of formulae in Ci, i 6 n. Let W0 ¼ W [ fP¼x cijx 2 F ; i 6 ng. The fol-
lowing is standard, and is not speciﬁc for our logic; we omit its proof.
Proposition 11
i. ‘ (ci ^ cj), where i5 j
ii. ‘(c1 _    _ cn)
iii. ‘wM cw1 _    _ cwr, where cw1 _    _ cwr are exactly those c’s which contain w as a conjunct, for each
w 2 W
Since u is consistent and hence there is at least one Ci such that u 2 Ci, as {u} = R0 can be extended to a W-
maximal consistent set in a ﬁnite variant of the Lindenbaum construction, [1, p. 197] (enumerate the members
of W as w1, . . . ,wk, let Rj+1 be Rj [ {w} if the latter set is consistent, else put Rj+1 = Rj; ﬁnally, put Ci =
Cu = Ck). Given this Cu, we construct a set U 	 Cu as follows. From Lemma 7, we know that for every con-
sistent set C and formula w, at least one set of the sequence (1) is also consistentC [ fP¼0 wg;C [ fP¼r1wg; . . . ;C [ fP¼rn1wg;C [ fP¼1 wg: ð1ÞNow, we obtain U from Cu as follows:
(1) let U0 = Cu (this set is consistent)
(2) for i = 1 to n, we know that there is some r 2 F such that Ui1 [ fP¼r cig will be consistent, and we make
the corresponding choice for Ui
We let U be Un; this is a consistent extension of Cu, which contains a probability in F for every ‘‘world’’ Ci
(i 6 n). We are now ready to deﬁne our canonical model Mc ¼ hW c; PcF ; pci as follows:
(1) W c ¼ fCug [ fCi j 9r > 0 P¼r ci 2 Ug
(2) ðPcF ðCiÞ ¼ rÞ () ðP¼r ci 2 UÞ
(3) p(Ci,p) = (p 2 Ci)Proposition 12. The model Mc is indeed a PFKD45 model.
This all leads us to the following coincidence lemma.
Lemma 13 (Coincidence). For all w 2 W and C 2Wc, Mc, C /= w iff w 2 C.
Now completeness follows immediately, we only sketch the proof: if PFKD450u, then u is consistent and,
by the Coincidence Lemma, u is satisﬁed inMc, C for some set C, and hencePFKD452u. Also note thatMc
is a ﬁnite model, which follows from the fact that it is constructed for a given u, which has ﬁnitely many
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Theorem 14 (Soundness and Completeness, Finite Models). For any formula u, we have PFKD45 
u iff PF KD45 ‘ u. Moreover, every consistent formula has a finite model.
Observation 15. If n is the number of atoms occurring in u, and f the cardinality of F, it is easy to see that there
are at most 2n  f 2n1 pairs (M, s) = (hW,PF,pi, s) that we need to consider for u’s satisﬁability: there are 2n
diﬀerent valuations as candidate for the current state s, and we can add all those diﬀerent valuations to W.
The model is then determined if we have ﬁxed a probability PF(w) for every valuation in w, but the probability
of the last of those is determined once the probability of the others is ﬁxed. For each w 2W except the last one,
we can make f diﬀerent choices for PF(w). The modelM can possibly be smaller by deleting all states w fromW
for which PF(w) = 0.3.3. Nested beliefs
Considering PFKD45 as a language for representing properties within individual agents, we next show that
nested belief formulae can be removed, i.e., any nested belief formula is equivalent to some formula without
nesting. First we show that the truth of probabilistic formulas is independent of the world of evaluation.
Lemma 16. Let M = hW,PF,pi be a PFKD45 model.
Then, ½9w 2 W ðM ;wÞ  PPc b () ½8u 2 W ðM ; uÞ  PPc b.
We are now going to show that nested beliefs are superﬂuous, in PFKD45. This result is a generalisation of
[19, Theorem 1.7.6.4], where it is proved for S5. This means that result still goes through when weakening the
logic to KD45, and even when having probabilistic operators.
Deﬁnition 17. We say that a formula w is in normal form if it is a disjunction of conjunctions each of the formd ¼ x ^ PPc1b1 ^ PPc2b2 ^    ^ PPcnbn ^ P>j1a1 ^ P>j2a2 ^    ^ P>jkak
where x, bi, aj, (i 6 n,j 6 k) are all purely propositional formulae. The formula d is called the canonical con-
junction and the sub-formulae PPci bi and P
>
jj
aj are called prenex formulae.
Lemma 18. If w is in normal form and contains a prenex formula r, then w may be supposed to have the form
p _ (k ^ r) where p, k and r are in normal form.
This lemma guarantees that prenex formulae can be moved to the outermost level.
Lemma 19 (Removal of Nested Beliefs). We have the following two equivalences in PFKD45: PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ $ ðPPa ðp _ kÞ ^ PPc bÞ _ ðPPa p ^ :PPc bÞ ð2Þ
 PPa ðp _ ðk ^ P>c bÞÞ $ ðPPa ðp _ kÞ ^ P>c bÞ _ ðPPa p ^ :P>c bÞ ð3ÞFrom this result it immediately follows (proof is omitted) that we can bring all the probabilistic operators to
the outermost level, giving us:
Theorem 20. Every formula u is equivalent to a formula, w, in normal form, i.e., a formula without nesting of
probabilistic operators.
Intuitively, having nested beliefs being reduced to a non-nested formula corresponds to the ideal rationality
feature of the agents we aim to design. That is, an agent that is certain about its own uncertainties.
For instance, suppose P¼0:8r. Then P
¼
1 P
¼
0:8r, and hence P
¼
1 ðP¼0:8r _ P¼0:2qÞ. If we assume that Prob(r)5 0.8 and
Prob(q)5 0.2, then Prob(r) = R and Prob(q) = Q for some R (diﬀerent from 0.8) and some Q5 0.2. Conse-
quently, it is everywhere the case that P¼1 ðP¼R r _ P¼QqÞ. Moreover, P¼0 P¼0:8r and P¼0 P¼0:2q would hold, and hence
the probability of their disjunction is also 0.
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an unfair one (e.g., Prob(head) = 0.8) with probability 0.5, and it is then able to reason about the probability
of the possible coin toss outcome h. In short, P¼0:5ðP¼0:5hÞ ^ P¼0:5ðP¼0:8hÞ. In fact, a formula such as P¼0:5ðP¼0:8headÞ
is always false in our semantics. This is so because the outermost probability in this case must always be either
0 or 1, once the probabilities are assigned by one and the same perfect reasoner agent. Therefore, what we can
model is the uncertainty of an agent who knows that the coin toss situation mentioned above reduces to
Prob(h) = 0.5(0.5 + 0.8) = 0.65.
4. Decision procedure
We now describe a practical decision procedure for PFKD45. This procedure aims to ﬁnd a ﬁnite model for
the agent’s speciﬁcation. That is, given the agent’s description (as a set of probabilistic formulae in the lan-
guage), the objective of the decision procedure is to determine a set of probability values that can be assigned
to the set of possible worlds in order to satisfy the given formula, if such a set of values exists.
According to the PFKD45 semantics, we know that P
>
x u holds if the sum of all the accessible worlds that
satisfy u is (strictly) greater than x. In other words, each probabilistic operator imposes a restriction on the
values that can be assigned to the worlds that satisfy the formulae it describes. As a consequence, having a
set of probabilistic formulae is like having a set of constraints over the values to be assigned to the possible
worlds. This gives us a hint of how a simple decision procedure might be produced—by translating formulae
into a set of numerical constraints on the possible valuations for propositions and then invoking an appropri-
ate constraint solver.
Thus, given a ﬁnite set of PFKD45 formulae, we generate a ﬁnite set of constraint (in)equalities. The com-
ponents of the inequalities represent all the possible truth valuations of the propositional symbols, and it is to
those components that probability values (that express the graded beliefs of the agent) are assigned. Solving
the (in)equalities produces, as a result, the set of values that can be assigned to the set of possible worlds in
order to satisfy the formulae presented. Consequently, once we have generated all the constraints for the for-
mulae in the speciﬁcation, we send this set of constraints to an appropriate solver. If the solver succeeds in
ﬁnding a solution, this gives a set of probability assignments to the set of possible worlds; if the solver fails,
no such assignment exists.
The approach can be summarized via the diagram in Fig. 2, while the algorithm comprising the decision
procedure is given in Fig. 3.
How are the inequalities generated from a given formula, u, of which the satisﬁability is to be tested?
First of all, we know from Theorem 20 that we may assume that u has an equivalent normal form
u = di _    _ dm, where every formula d is of the form x ^ PPc1b1 ^ PPc2b2 ^    ^ PPcnbn ^ P>j1a1^
P>j2a2 ^    ^ P>jkak. All the formulas x, bi, aj (i 6 n,j 6 k) are propositional. If x has a propositional model,
this is a candidate for the state s (this is line 11 of the procedure) for the pair (M, s) that we are after. More-
over, each d gives rise to a set of constraints ConðAtðuÞ; F ; fPPc1b1; . . . ; PPcnbn; P>j1a1; . . . ; P>jkakgÞ as follows.
At(u) is the set of all atoms p, q, r, . . . occurring in u. Put every bi and aj into Disjunctive Normal Form
DNF(bi) and DNF(aj), respectively, where each atom from At(u) is used. For instance, if bi = p _ q, and
At(u) = {p,q, r}, then DNF(bi) = (p ^ q ^ r) _ (p ^ q ^ r) _ (p ^ q ^ r) _ (p ^ q ^ r) _ (p ^ q ^ r) _
(p ^ q ^ r).Fig. 2. Relation between PFKD45 and decision procedure.
Fig. 3. A decision procedure for PFKD45.
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fPPc1 b1; . . . ; PPcn bn; P>j1a1; . . . ; P>jkakgÞ consists of the following inequalities, where (*) is an overall-constraint,
f0 . . . f7 are F-speciﬁc constraints, and CðPPci biÞ is generated by PPci bi; similarly for CðP>jjajÞ.ð
Þ p0q1r0þ p0q1r1þ p1q0r0þ p1q0r1þ p1q1r0þ p1q1r1 ¼ 1
f0 p0q0r0 2 F
. . . . . . . . .
f7 p1q1r1 2 F
. . . . . . . . .
ðCðPPci ÞbiÞ p1q0r0þ p1q0r1þ p1q1r0þ p1q1r1þ p0q1r0þ p0q1r1 P ci
. . . . . . . . .
ðCðP>jjajÞÞ . . . > jj
. . . . . . . . .Think of an expression such as p0q0r0 + p0q0r1 > q as the constraint that the probability of those worlds
satisfying p ^ q must be greater than q. The constraint (*) expresses the fact that a tautology should have
probability 1, but also that there are no other worlds than those satisfying one of the combinations appearing
as a term within it.
We now establish correctness of the decision procedure. We begin by noting that, if a PFKD45 formula is
satisﬁable, then any model produced must satisfy one of the constraint sets Ci generated by the procedure
from di outlined above.
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one for each di in u’s normal form (as described above), then: M is a model for u if, and only if, M is a solution for
a solvable set of constraints C 2 CðuÞ.
Given the particular form of linear inequalities generated, and the fact that constraint solvers exist for such
constraints, we also have the following result.
Observation 22. A solution for any set of constraints Ci will be found if one exists.
Note that it is guaranteed that the solver ﬁnds a solution, if there is one. That is, solving a ﬁnite set of con-
straint (in)equalities over a ﬁnite set F of probabilities is a decidable problem.
Given these results, the correctness of the decision procedure is straightforward.
Theorem 23 (Decision Procedure). A formula u in PFKD45, over the base set F, is satisfiable if, and only if,
our decision procedure generates a model for u and, conversely, every solvable set Ci in C corresponds to a model
for u.
Example 3 (Continued). Depending on the action taken (valuation taken for both dunk(package1)
and dunk(package2)), the last sentence causes (or not—when D4) the set of probabilistic beliefs to be
unsatisﬁable. In other words, what we can show is that there are 4 possible cases: 3 in which the set of beliefs
is unsatisﬁable:dunkðpackage1Þ ^ :dunkðpackage2Þ
:dunkðpackage1Þ ^ dunkðpackage2Þ
dunkðpackage1Þ ^ :dunkðpackage2Þand one that shows a consistent setdunkðpackage1Þ ^ dunkðpackage2Þ
The implemented decision procedure automatically ﬁnds such a consistent set, indicating how the action of the
robot can be planned.
Of course, the number of models that we mention in Observation 15 is huge, and indeed, ﬁnding a model
for a formula (if it exists) is NP-complete. This follows from a an observation in [11] about Integer Program-
ming, as which our satisﬁability problem can be phrased.
Deﬁnition 24. [11, p. 245] The following problem is called Integer Programming. INSTANCE. Given are the
following. A ﬁnite set X of pairs ðx; bÞ, where x is an m-tuple of integers and b is an integer, an m-tuple c of
integers, and an integer B. QUESTION: Is there an m-tuple y of integers such that x  y 6 b for all ðx; bÞ 2 X
and such that c  y P B (where the dot-product u  v of two m-tuples v = (u1,u2, . . . ,um) and v ¼ ðv1; v2; . . . ; vmÞ
is given by
Pm
i¼1uivi?
Theorem 25. [11, p. 245] The problem of Integer Programming as defined in Definition 24 is NP-complete.
Recall how we assume our formula u to be in normal form w = d1 _    _ dm, where each di is of the
form di ¼ x ^ PPc1b1 ^ PPc2b2 ^    ^ PPcnbn ^ P>j1a1 ^ P>j2a2 ^    ^ P>jkak. We now argue how ﬁnding a solu-
tion for the inequalities induced by di (that is, steps 12–14 in our procedure) is an Integer Programming
problem.
First of all, the dimension m of Deﬁntion 24 is going to be 2n, where n is the number of propositional atoms
in u, say these atoms are p1, . . .pn. We know from Observation 2 that F is generated by some d, that is, F ¼
f0; 1d ; 2d ; . . . ; ddg. Now, every entry yi in y corresponds to d Æ Pi, where P0 is the variable p10p20 . . . pn10 pn0;
P 1 ¼ p10p20 . . . pn10 pn1; P 2 ¼ p10p20 . . . pn11 pn0, etc. Now consider a subformula PPc b in Di. We know c is a rational
number, say c ¼ st. The constraint that PPc b gives rise to looks likek0  p10 . . . pn0 þ . . .þ k2n  p11 . . . pn1 P
s
t
ð4Þ
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tot  d  k0  p10 . . . pn0 þ . . .þ t  d  k2n  p11 . . . pn1 P d  s ð5Þ
and hence, for each PPc b, we add ðx; bÞ to X, with x ¼ ðt  d  j0; . . . ; t  d  j2nÞ and b = d Æ s.
Next, for every subformula P>j a, the constraint that we would obtain looks likek0  p10 . . . pn0 þ . . .þ k2n  p11 . . . pn1 > a ð6Þ
where, as before, ki is 1 if the corresponding disjunct occurs in a, and 0 otherwise. But since we know that each
value for p1z1p
2
z2
. . . pnzn is a multiple of d, the left hand side of (6) must also be a multiple of d. Hence, let a
>
F be
the smallest element in F for which a>F . It is easy to see that, given that each variable p
1
z1
p2z2 . . . p
n
zn
must be in F,
Eq. (6) is equivalent to (7), and we can proceed to add a member ðx; bÞ to X as we did above.k0  p10 . . . pn0 þ    þ k2n  p11 . . . pn1 P a>F ð7ÞFinally, we address the overall constraint (*):ð
Þd  p10p20 . . . pn10 pn0 þ d  p10p20 . . . pn11 pn0 þ    þ d  p11p21 . . . pn11 pn1 ¼ dFor this constraint, we add ðx; bÞ ¼ ðð1; 1; . . . ; 1Þ; dÞ to X, and we choose also c ¼ ð1; 1; . . . ; 1Þ and B = d.
It is easy to see that this shows that the question whether di ¼ x ^ PPc1 b1 ^ PPc2b2 ^    ^ PPcn bn ^ P>j1a1^
P>j2a2 ^    ^ P>jkak can be made true by assigning probabilities in F to each combination of propositional
atoms, is equivalent to the translated Integer Programming problem.
Admittedly, Theorem 25 together with the observations above provide a negative result for our decision
procedure: even solving the constraints for the probabilistic part is NP-complete, and, obviously, to check
whether the propositional part of the given formula (step 10 in our procedure) is also NP-complete. We have
not, looked into whether there are ways to cope with this NP-completeness, but what we did do is implement a
toy system that ﬁnds a model for a formula, if it has one (see [3]). The development of our PFKD45 decision
procedure involved Prolog programming, making use of Sicstus Prolog v3.12.2 and its inbuilt module
clp(FD), a constraint logic programming solver over ﬁnite (integer) domains [2]. In short, we have an
executable module that receives, as input, a set of probabilistic belief formulae and outputs all the possible
probability assignments that satisfy the restrictions that those formulae impose. Furthermore, we also provide
as input the set F that should be considered for that particular set of formulae.
Further development of the system incorporates also temporal operators allowing us to reason also about
(discrete) time information [3,4]. However, this is a story to be told in detail at another occasion.5. Conclusion
We have shown how the PFKD45 logic preserves important results about soundness, completeness, and
decidability of its predecessor PFD [24]. We have also presented new results about nested beliefs, and a descrip-
tion and implementation of a decision procedure for the logic. A brief example was used to show how the lan-
guage can serve as an appropriate agent speciﬁcation language.
Our logic is conceptually simple and compact. Compactness refers to the fact that a set of sentences is sat-
isﬁable if, and only if, every subset of it is satisﬁable. Logics that allow us to express that Prob(u)  r are, in
general, not compact, witness the set of premises CfProbðqÞ > aja 2 Q \ ½0; 1Þg
Then, obviously, we have CProb(q) = 1, but there is no ﬁnite subset of C that proves this conclusion. This
has a computational counterpart: a mechanical device verifying whether a set of premises {Prob(u)  r} is
satisﬁable in Q \ ½0; 1, in principle has to check an inﬁnite number of assignments of probabilities to formulae
u. For these reasons, we assume that the range of allowed probabilities is a ﬁnite set F  [0,1]. Thus, the
compactness of our approach has beneﬁts, especially with respect to computational tractability aspects. This
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logic similar to ours (but also allowing predicates) and with the same motivation was presented in [23]. Its
semantics is based on measure spaces, and all formulas are interpreted on a set (of what we call states)–even
the propositional ones. Decidability is reduced ‘‘to an easy problem of linear programming, which can
be easily solved’’ [23, p. 3]. We are more explicit about the completeness proof and the algorithm to ﬁnd a
model.
Although the use of the set base F causes logical restrictions, it is possible to highlight some interesting
aspects (cf. [24]). For instance, if we take F = {0,1}, we have the classical modal logic. Having Driankov’s
linguistic estimates (as in [5]) impossible, extremely unlikely, very low chance, small chance, it may, meaningful
chance, most likely, extremely likely, certain would be modelled by a 9-element F. And the same analogy can be
used for any ﬁnite range of values to be assumed. In other words, the granularity of F can be chosen according
to the intended agent’s application.
PFKD45 is a system that combines logic and probability. In this sense, it is related to other work that
showed how this combination would be possible in alternative ways [16,10]. One of those possible approaches
is the interpretation of the modal belief operator according to the concept of ‘‘likelihood’’ as in [15]. In this
logic, instead of using numbers to express uncertainty one would have expressions like ‘‘p is likely to be a con-
sistent hypothesis’’ (since a state is taken as a set of hypotheses ‘‘true for now’’). That is, a qualitative notion of
likelihood of events rather than explicit probabilities. A more detailed comparison between the notions of like-
lihood and probability can be found in [14].
The PFKD45 logic was designed for reasoning with (exact) probabilities, and its Probabilistic Kripke Model
semantics is similar to the one presented in [7,6]. In those formalisms, a formula is typically a Boolean com-
bination of expressions of the form a1w(u1) +    + anw(un)P c, where a1, . . . ,an, c are integers. The system in
[7,6] includes, as axioms, all the formulae of linear inequalities, and consequently, their proofs of completeness
to rely on results in the area of linear programming. Our logic is conceptually simpler. Furthermore, in
PFKD45 we can express statements such as ‘‘p is true, although its probability is less than 0.1’’, something that
their formalism is unable to represent, once they do not allow ‘‘w-free formulae’’. The paper [13] is close to
ours: it also considers a ﬁxed probability for the agent that does not depend on the current state, and identiﬁes
a probability of 1 with belief.
Another approach can be found in [20]. The probabilistic epistemic logic used there is a special case of the
one presented in [6]. The additional feature in Milch and Koller’s work is the fact of having an algorithm for
ﬁnding the probability of the deﬁned formula model using Bayesian networks. This allows them to model the
formulae without constructing the probabilistic epistemic model explicitly. That is, there is no explicit repre-
sentation of an agent’s probability distribution, or enumeration of states/worlds. This is possible once it is
assumed that agents have a common prior probability distribution over outcomes and their beliefs diﬀers only
by diﬀerent observations.
Finally, PFKD45 diﬀers mainly from other systems for representing beliefs and probability by allowing only
a ﬁnite range of probability values, an assumption that at the same time imposes restrictions about the values
that can be assigned to the possible worlds and permits the restoration of compactness for the logic. In [22],
Ognjanovic´ and Ra˘skovic´ present a probabilistic logic suitable for describing events in a discrete sample space.
Informally, their basic operator expresses that the probability of a certain event is in a particular set, a notion
intuitively similar to ours.
In summary, we have a language that is conceptually simple and compact. Besides, by having an imple-
mented module for deciding the probability attribution to the possible worlds, we have shown how that the
language is a powerful tool not only for theoretical reasoning, but also for eﬀective implementation of com-
putational agents that deal with uncertainty.Acknowledgements
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Proof of Lemma 4
L1.:P61 u)D3P<0 :u)D2P>1 u
)D1:PP0 :u)A4 ?L2.PP1 u)L1PP1 u ^ P61 u)D1;D3:P>0 :u ^ :P<0 :u
)D2:P<1 u ^ :P>1 u)D4P¼1 u
P¼1 u)D4:P>1 u ^ :P<1 u)A1:P<1 u
)D2:P>0 :u)D1PP1 u Proof of Observation 2. From right to left is obvious, so suppose F is a base set. Let d = min{y  xjx, y 2 F,
y  x > 0}. That is, d is the smallest positive diﬀerence between any two members of F. Let x and y be elements
of F for which d = y  x. Since F is a base, (1  x) 2 F and, since 0 < d 6 1, we have 1  d 2 [0,1), and hence
y + (1  x) = 1  d is also in F. It follows that d 2 F, and hence all k Æ d 6 1 are such that k Æ d 2 F. But also,
these must make up all elements in F, since if for some f 2 F, f would not be a multiple of d, we would either
ﬁnd a k such that k Æ d < f < (k + 1) Æ d or a biggest k with k Æ d < f < 1. In both cases, f  k Æ d would be
smaller than d, which is in contradiction with how d is choosen, i.e., as the minimal distance between two
members of F. u
Proof of Theorem 5
(a) All KD45-properties of B are derivable in PFKD45:
(1) ‘ u) ‘Bu (directly from R2)
(2) ‘ B(u! w)! (Bu! Bw) (from A2)
(3) ‘ B?:By R2, we have that ‘ PP1 ð?!?Þ ()
PP1 ?)ðyÞ;A1PP1 ? ^PP1 ð?!?Þ
)A3P>0 ? )D2P<1>
)A0:ð:P<1> ^ :P>1>Þ )D4:P¼1>
)R2;L2 ?
(4) ‘ Bu! BBu (from A9)
(5) ‘ Bu! BBu
:Bu  :PP1 u  P>0 :u
)A7PPxi :u)A8PP1 PPx1:u
)R2PP1 PPx1:u ^ PP1 ð:u! :uÞ
)A3PP1 PPx1:u ^ PP1 ðPPx1:u! P>0 :uÞ
)A2PP1 P>0 :u  B:Bu(b) The ‘(’ part follows from item a above; the ‘)’ part will be obvious from the semantics for PFKD45
given later, together with the soundness of PFKD45 and the completeness of KD45 hProof of Lemma 10. It is straightforward to check that all the axioms are valid on PFKD45 and that the
inference rules R1 and R2 preserve validity. h
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of Axiom A6 is derivable:A60PP1 :ðu ^ wÞ ! ððP¼x u ^ P¼y wÞ ! P¼xþyðu _ wÞÞ ðwhere xþ y 2 ½0; 1Þ
Once A6
0
has been established, we reason as follows: Let ri be such that P
¼
ri
ðciÞ 2 U, i.e., PcF ðCiÞ ¼ ri. By Lem-
ma 7 and T3, we know that such an ri exists, that it is unique, and a member of F. All ci’s are mutually exclu-
sive and their disjunction is derivable (Proposition 11). But then, using A6
0
, we conclude, from
ðP¼r1c1 ^ P¼r2c2Þ 2 U, that P¼r1þr2ðc1 _ c2Þ 2 U. And since also (c1 _ c2) and c3 are mutually exclusive, we ﬁnd
P¼r1þr2þr3ðc1 _ c2 _ c3Þ 2 U. Eventually, we ﬁnd P¼r c 2 U, where r ¼
P
i6nri and c =¤ i6n ci. Since (use Propo-
sition 11) PP1 c 2 U, we ﬁnd
P
i6nri ¼ 1, i.e., PcF ðfC j C 2 W cgÞ ¼ 1. We ﬁnally prove derivability of A6
0
.
Assume PP1 :ðu ^ wÞ ^ ððP¼x u ^ P¼y wÞ. We know (Lemma 7 and T3) that x,y 2 F. By Observation 2, F is
generated by some d, so let x = k Æ d and y = m Æ d. If k = m = x = y = 0, we have to prove that P¼0 ðu _ wÞ,
which is easy: by Axiom A4, the only other possibility for the disjunction would be P>0 ðu _ wÞ, and then, by
Axiom bf A5, we would have P>0 u _ P>0 w, which, (use T2) contradicts the assumption P¼0 u ^ P¼0 w. Without
lack of generality, assume that x = k Æ d5 0. Let z be a number (k  1) Æ d < z < k Æ d. Since we have P¼x u,
using A3, we have P>z u. Using A6, we then conclude P
P
t ðu _ wÞ, where t = z + y, i.e.,
(m + k  1) Æ d < t < (m + k) Æ d, with (m + k) Æ d the smallest number in F greater than t. Using A7, we ﬁnd
PPðmþkÞdðu _ wÞ, or PPxþyðu _ wÞ. This means we have either P>xþyðu _ wÞ or P¼xþyðu _ wÞ. The ﬁrst of these
options cannot be, since with A5 it would yield P>x u _ P>y w, which is impossible given P¼x u ^ P¼y w. h
Proof of Lemma 13. We consider the modal case. Suppose P>s d 2 C, and let d  (c1 _    _ cv). Either C = Cu,
and we immediately obtain U ‘ P>s d, or else let c be the characteristic formula for C, then, since Cu5 C 2Wc,
we have U ‘ P>0 c, and, by A2, we have U ‘ P>0 P>s d. By A8, we conclude U ‘ P>s d.
Then, U ‘ P>s ðc1 _    _ cvÞ, and, by T8, with s " being the ﬁrst member of F greater than s,
U ‘ WriPs"P¼ri ðc1 _    _ cvÞ. Let t1, . . . ,tv be such that fP¼t1 c1; . . . ; P¼tv cvg  U. Let t = t1 + . . . + tv. By
deﬁnition of PcF , we have P
c
F ðCiÞ ¼ tiði 6 vÞ, and, by induction, Mc,Ci ci. Since every two diﬀerent ci and
cj logically exclude each other (Proposition 11), we have PcF ðfCijMc;Ci  cigÞ ¼ t, and hence Mc;C  P¼t d.
Now, obviously t > s, since we have that U is consistent, U ‘ P>s d and U ‘ P¼t d. We conclude that
Mc;C  P>s d.
Conversely, suppose Mc;C  P>s d. Then, for some r 2 F, both r > s and PcF ðfDjd 2 DgÞ ¼ r. Again,
assuming d  (c1 _    _ cv), there are r1, . . . ,rv, such that r1 +    + rv = r, ci 2 Ci and PcF ðCiÞ ¼ ri (i 6 v). By
deﬁnition of Mc, we have P¼rxcrx 2 U. If v = 1, we have c1 = d and r1 = r, and hence P¼r d. For vP 2, we show
by induction on v that if ‘ (ci ^ cj)(i5 j 6 v) then ‘
V
i6vP
¼
ri ci ! P¼r1þþrvðc1 _    _ cvÞ. For v = 2 this is
immediate from T8, Theorem 6. Suppose it holds for v, and consider ‘ (ci ^ cj)(i5 j 6 v + 1). It follows that
‘ PP1 ððc1 _    _ cvÞ ^ cvþ1Þ. Now assume P¼ri ci (i 6 v + 1). By induction, we have P¼r1þ...rvðc1 _    _ cvÞ. Using
T8 again yields P¼r1þ...rvþ1ðc1 _    _ cvþ1Þ. This proves U ‘ P¼r d, and hence, by T1, U ‘ PPr d and by A3, U ‘ P>s d
(). Now, to arrive at a contradiction, suppose P>s d 62 C. By construction of our set of formulae W then, we
know that for some t 6 s, P¼t d 2 C. Since PcF ðCÞ > 0, we have U ‘ P>0 P¼t d, and hence, by A8, U ‘ P¼t d, which is
in contradiction with (). h
Proof of Lemma 16. The ( direction is trivial, since W5 ;. For) , observe that ðM ;wÞ  PPx u iff PF
ðfw0 : ðM ;w0Þ  ugÞP x iff ðM ; uÞ  PPx u h
Proof of Lemma 18. w is in normal form, so w = d1 _ d2 _    _ dm, where di0s are canonical conjunctions. Sup-
pose r occurs in dm. Then r must be some conjunct P
P
c , so that dm can be written as (k ^ r). Taking p to be
(d1 _ d2 _    _ dm1) gives the desired result w = p _ (k ^ r). h
Proof of Lemma 19. We sketch the proof of (2). As ðM ; sÞ  PPc b _ :PPc b, there are two possible cases to
consider.
First Case. Assuming ðM ; sÞ  PPc b we aim to show that
PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ $ ðPPa ðp _ kÞ ^ PPc bÞ
50 N. de Carvalho Ferreira et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 35–51For the ‘!’ direction, note that ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ ! ðp _ kÞ is a tautology. Hence, the truth of
PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ in s implies that of PPa ðp _ kÞ in s (using A2). This, together with ðM ; sÞ  PPc b leads toðM ; sÞ  PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ ! ðPPa ðp _ kÞ ^ PPc bÞand this is valid for any state since ðM ; sÞ  PPc b iff 8u 2 S; ðM ; uÞ  PPc b.
Concerning the converse, from PPa ðp _ kÞ ^ PPc b we have that both PPa ðp _ kÞ and PPc b are true in all
u 2 S:ð8uÞðM ; uÞ  k iff k ^ PPc b is also true. So,
ðM ; sÞ  ðPPa ðp _ kÞ ^ PPc bÞ ! PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ; and therefore;
ðM ; sÞ  PPc b! ðPPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ $ ðPPa ðp _ kÞ ^ PPc bÞÞ ðA:1ÞSecond Case. Assuming that ðM ; sÞ  :PPc b, we will show that
ðM ; sÞ  PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ $ ðPPa p ^ :PPc bÞFor the ‘!’ direction, suppose that ðM ; sÞ  PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ. If this holds for s, it holds for all u. So,
8u; ðM ; uÞ  PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ ðA:2ÞBy a similar argument, 8uðM ; uÞ  :PPc b, if ðM ; sÞ  :PPc b, and hence
ðM ; uÞ  PP1 :PPc b ðA:3ÞCombining A.2 and A.3, we get M ; u  PPa p. Hence:
ðM ; sÞ  PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ ! ðPPa p ^ :PPc bÞFor the converse, p! (p _ r) is a tautology. So, we can say that
ðM ; sÞ  ðPPa p ^ :PPc bÞ ! PPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ; and; consequently;
ðM ; sÞ  :PPc b! ðPPa ðp _ ðk ^ PPc bÞÞ $ ðPPa p ^ :PPc bÞÞ ðA:4ÞAfter considering the two cases we can, ﬁnally, use the propositional tautology [(p! (qM (p ^ r))) ^
(p! (qM (p ^ s)))]! [(qM ((r ^ p) _ (s ^  p)))], together with (A.1) and (A.4) to conclude (2). h
Proof of Lemma 21. If M is a model for u, it must be a model for one di’s in u’s normal form. It is clear that
this M then satisﬁes the constraints Ci 2 CðuÞ, where Ci is generated by di. Conversely, every probabilistic
model Mi that satisﬁes the constraints of Ci 2 CðuÞ, is a model for di, and hence for u. h
Proof of Theorem 23. We split the proof into two cases.
• u is satisﬁable.
The constraints generated will be passed on to the constraint solver. By Lemma 21, a solution must exist if a
model exists, and by Observation 22, the solver will ﬁnd a solution if one exists.
• u is unsatisﬁable.
By Lemma 21, the constraints generated should have no solution since there is no model. By Observation
22, the solver will, indeed, fail to ﬁnd a solution. hReferences
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